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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the nature of optimal capital taxation in an
economy where labor unions set wages. Wage contracts are called
binding, if they protect investors against immediate expropriation af-
ter new machines are installed. I show that in order to maintain ag-
gregate production efficiency the government needs a labor tax only
in the presence and taxes on both labor and capital in the absence of
binding contracts. In addition, I construct optimal tax rules for the
cases of both binding and non-binding wage contracts.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers optimal factor income taxation when the wages de-
termined by collective bargaining. In optimal taxation models with capi-
tal accumulation and no inherent distortions, the classical outcome is the
Chamley-Judd (hereafter C-J) result: capital income should be taxed at a
zero rate in the long run.1 Because capital appears only in the production
but not in the utility function, it should not be taxed, if there are enough
instruments to separate consumption and production decisions. Later on,
it has been shown that if the goods or asset markets are incomplete, then
non-zero capital taxation is in general optimal,2 and the validity of the C-J
result depends sensitively on the set of available tax instruments.3 This pa-
per attempts to find out the minimum set of tax instruments that supports
the C-J result in an economy with collective bargaining.
Domeij (2005) examines optimal factor income taxation with imperfect
labor markets. He uses a matching model with the following properties.
When workers are unsuccessful in their search for new employment, they end
up in unemployment. When there is a successful match, the surplus of the
firm is divided through worker-firm bargaining. Domeij’s (2005) main result
is that if the government is constrained to the taxation of capital and labor
income, then the optimal capital income tax is in general non-zero, but if the
government has access to other tax instruments, then the C-J result survives.
In Domeij’s (2005) matching model, it is implicitly assumed that worker-
firm bargaining over the wage is carried out within a single firm after a
worker has secured a job. In many European countries, the wages are however
determined from outside for a single firm by bargaining between a labor union
representing the workers and an employer federation representing the firms in
the industry. In that case, wage settlement diﬀers from Domeij’s framework
in two respects. First, the labor union is interested in total employment
in the industry rather than in a single firm. Second, there is a strategic
1Cf. Judd (1985), Chamley (1986) and Correia (1996). As a matter of fact, the C-J
result is a dynamic counterpart of the result obtained by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)
that intermediate goods should not be taxed.
2Cf. Aiyagari (1995), and Judd (1997, 2002).
3Cf. Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997), Lansing (1999), Coleman (2000), and Judd
(1999, 2002).
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dependence between investment and wage settlement. In the latter, there
are two alternatives:4
(i) Wage contracts are called binding, if they protect investors against im-
mediate expropriation after new machines are installed. In such a case,
there is an institution or a commitment technology, through which a
labor union can credibly bind itself to a particular sequence of wages.5
(ii) Wage contracts are called non-binding, if investors must take into account
that a union may revise its wages just after new machines have been
installed and thus expropriate some of the rent of investment. In such
a case, there is no commitment technology for a labor union.
In each country, legislation determines the category (case (i) or (ii) above) of
collective bargaining institutions. In the Scandinavian countries, where wage
contracts are made at the industry level and extended to cover all employers
and employees in the industry, institutions correspond to the case (i). With
the comparison of cases (i) and (ii), it is possible to examine the implications
of labor market institutions for the design of optimal taxation.
Wage bargaining is commonly modeled as a game where two parties make
alternately oﬀers to each other to share a “pie” of exogenous size.6 Unfor-
tunately, because that game cannot be consistently integrated into a model
where capital stock and income (the “pie”) evolve over time, I must content
myself with the special case of a monopoly union. To enable public pol-
icy, I assume that there is also a commitment technology through which the
government can bind itself to a particular sequence of taxes once and for all.
So far, the literature on optimal capital taxation with labor unions has
been very slim.7 Palokangas (1987 and 2000, Ch. 4) shows that in a static
general equilibrium framework, aggregate production eﬃciency can be main-
tained in the presence of industrial monopoly unions. This study examines
4Cf. Grout (1984), or Palokangas (2000), Ch. 5 and 6.
5For the definition of a commitment technology, cf. Chari and Kehoe (1999), p. 1688.
6Cf. Binmore et al. (1986).
7Aronsson et al. (2001) examine a shift of income taxation from labor to capital.
They however assume a wage-setting monopoly union that maximizes the utility of the
representative household in the economy. Koskela and von Thadden (2002) show that
capital income should be taxed at a non-zero rate. In contrast to this paper, they however
do not analyze the strategic dependence between investment and wage settlement.
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whether the same result also holds true in a dynamic general equilibrium
framework where private agents accumulate capital.
In this study, I use a modification of Chari and Kehoe’s (1999) model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies tech-
nology, preferences and taxation. Section 3 establishes a dynamic game in
the absence of binding wage contracts. In that case, the strategic order of
decisions is taxation, investment, wage settlement and production. Corre-
spondingly, section 4 establishes a dynamic game in the presence of binding
wage contracts. The order of decisions is then taxation, wage settlement,
investment and production. Both games result in optimal taxation rules.
2 Households, firms and the government
I aggregate all products in the economy into a single good which is chosen as
the numeraire. This is used in consumption, investment and public spending.
I denote the period t by subscript t, the present by t = 0 and assume that all
agents (households, firms, unions and the government) observe same number
T > 2 of periods in the future. Agents can change their control variables
only in future t ∈ {1, ..., T}. At present t = 0, all variables are historically
determined and therefore given for all agents. I denote by {At} the sequence
of any variable At throughout future t ∈ {1, ..., T}. There is an income tax
τt ∈ (−∞, 1) on labor and an income tax θt ∈ (−∞, 1) on capital. I assume
that there is a commitment technology through which government can set
the sequences of taxes {τt, θt} so that the other agents take them as given.
The representative household is subject to the budget constraint
Bt+1 = (1 + rt)Bt + It − Ct with It
.
=
(
1− τt
)
wtLt + πt for t ∈ {1, ..., T},
(1)
where Bt is the holdings of government bonds, rt the interest rate paid to
bonds, It income and Ct consumption at time t, and wt is the wage, Lt
employment, πt the profit and τt ∈ (−∞, 1) the labor tax at time t. Its
utility is a function of consumption Ct and total employment Lt as follows:
U =
T∑
t=1
ρt
[
1
1− σ
C1−σt − Lt
]
,
σ > 0, σ = 1, 0 < ρ < 1, (2)
3
where the constant ρ is the discount factor and the constant σ the inverse
of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. The household maximizes
its utility (2) subject to the budget constraint (1) by its sequence of its
consumption {Ct}, taking the sequences of the interest rate {rt}, total income
{It} and total employment {Lt} as given. This yields the Euler equations
(
Ct+1/Ct
)σ
= (1 + rt+1)ρ for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}. (3)
Given that the utility function (2) is linear in employment, the unit op-
portunity cost of employment is the inverse of the marginal utility of income
C−σ and therefore equal to Cσ. Eﬀective labor income at time t is then equal
to the wages net of taxes,
(
1− τt
)
wtLt, minus the total opportunity cost of
employment, Cσt Lt, at time t:
Wt
.
=
(
1− τt
)
wtLt − C
σ
t Lt. (4)
At each time t, the representative firm produces its output Yt from capital
Kt and labor Lt through technology
Yt = F (Kt, Lt), FK > 0, FL > 0, FLL < 0, FKL > 0, FKK < 0, (5)
where subscripts K and L denote partial derivatives with respect to Kt and
Lt, respectively. It decides on its labor input before it decides on its invest-
ment. Therefore, the firm takes the wage wt and capital stock Kt as given
and maximizes its profit Π = F (Kt, Lt) − wtLt by labor input Lt at each
time t. By duality, this maximization yields
wt = FL(Kt, Lt), Π(Kt, wt) = max
Lt
[F (Kt, Lt)− wtLt],
Lt = L(Kt, wt) = −Πw(Kt, wt),
∂L
∂K
= −
FKL
FLL
> 0,
∂L
∂w
=
1
FLL
< 0,
ΠK(Kt, wt) = FK(Kt, Lt) > 0, ΠKK < 0, (6)
where subscripts K and w denote partial derivatives with respect to Kt and
wt, respectively. The elasticity of the demand for labor with respect to the
wage wt, when capital Kt is held constant, is given by
ε(Kt, Lt)
.
=
∣∣∣∣wtLt
∂L
∂w
∣∣∣∣ = − wtLt
∂L
∂w
= −
FL(Kt, Lt)
LtFLL(Kt, Lt)
> 0. (7)
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I assume that the rate of capital depreciation, µ, is constant. Capital
stock Kt then accumulates according to
Kt+1 −Kt = (1− θt)Π(Kt, wt)− πt − µKt for t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T}, (8)
where Kt+1 −Kt is gross investment, Π(Kt, wt) the profit, θt ∈ (−∞, 1) the
capital tax, πt dividents and µKt capital depreciation. Solving for πt from
(8), one obtains the present value of the firm as:
P
.
=
T∑
t=1
πt∏t
ι=0(1 + rι)
=
T∑
t=1
(1− θt)Π(Kt, wt) + (1− µ)Kt −Kt+1∏t
ι=0(1 + rι)
, (9)
where rt is the interest rate at time t. The firm maximizes its present value
(9) by its sequence of capital {Kt} subject to accumulation technology (8).
Inserting Lt from (6) into eﬀective labor income (4) yields
Wt = W (wt, Ct, Kt, τt)
.
=
[(
1− τt
)
wt − C
σ
t
]
Lt(Kt, wt). (10)
All workers of the representative firm are organized in the same labor union.
Because both the representative firm and the corresponding union are small
relative to the whole economy, it is plausible to assume that they take the
sequences of the interest rate {rt} aggregate consumption {Ct} as given. The
union maximizes the present value of its members’ eﬀective labor income (10),
T∑
t=1
W (wt, Ct, Kt, τt)∏t
ι=0(1 + rι)
. (11)
I assume that public spending at each time t, Et, is exogenous in terms
of the numeraire good. The government’s budget constraint is then given by
Dt+1 = (1 + rt)Dt + Et − θtΠ(Kt, wt)− τtwtL(Kt, wt) for t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T},
(12)
where Dt is the stock of government bonds and rt the interest rate at time
t. The equilibrium condition for the goods market are given by
Ct = Yt −
[
Kt+1 + (µ− 1)Kt
]
− Et = Ψ(Kt+1, Kt, Lt)− Et with
Ψ
(
Kt+1, Kt, Lt
) .
= F
(
Kt, Lt
)
−Kt+1 + (1− µ)Kt for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}, (13)
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where Yt is output, Et public spending, Ct consumption and Kt+1+(µ−1)Kt
total investment in capital at time t.
The supply of government bonds, Dt, must be equal to the demand for
these, Bt. If the government’s budget constraint, (12), and the equilibrium
condition of the goods market, (13), hold, then by Walras’ law, the house-
holds’ budget constraint (1) holds true as well.8 Thus, the households’ budget
constraint (1) can be ignored in the government planning problem.
3 Non-binding contracts
With non-binding wage contracts, the union takes the sequences of aggregate
consumption {Ct}, the interest rate {rt} capital {Kt} and the tax {τt} as
given and maximizes the present value of its members’ eﬀective labor income,
(11), by the sequence of wages {wt}. This is equivalent to the maximization
of eﬀective labor income (10) by the wage wt for given Ct, rt, Kt and τt at
each time t. Noting (6), (7) and (10), this leads to the equilibrium conditions
wt = w(Ct, Kt, τt) = argmax
wt
W (wt, Ct, Kt, τt) and
1− τt
(1− τt)wt − Cσt
=
ε
wt
for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}. (14)
I define the elasticity of the wage wt with respect to capital stock Kt, when
aggregate consumption Ct and the tax τt are kept constant, as follows:
β(Ct, Kt, τt)
.
=
Kt
w(Ct, Kt, τt)
∂w
∂Kt
(Ct, Kt, τt). (15)
With non-binding contracts, the firm takes the expected outcome (14) of
wage bargaining into account in its investment decisions. Inserting (14) into
the present value of the firm, (9), one obtains
P =
T∑
t=1
1∏t
ι=0(1 + rι)
[
(1− θt)Π
(
Kt, wt(Ct, Kt, τt)
)
+ (1− µ)Kt −Kt+1
]
.
(16)
The firm chooses its sequence of capital {Kt} to maximize its present value
(16), given the sequences of aggregate consumption {Ct}, the interest rate
8Summing up (12) and (13), and noting (5), (6), (10) and Dt = Bt, one obtains (1).
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{rt} and the taxes {τt, θt}. Noting (3), (6) and (15), this maximization yields
(
Ct/Ct−1
)σ
/ρ+ µ− 1 = µ+ rt
= (1− θt)
[
ΠK
(
Kt, w(Ct, Kt, τt)
)
+Πw
(
Kt, w(Ct, Kt, τt)
) ∂w
∂Kt
]
= (1− θt)
[
FK
(
Kt, Lt
)
− βwtLt/Kt
]
for t ∈ {1, 2..., T}. (17)
Because the equations (17) and Lt = L(Kt, wt) [Cf. (6)] define a one-to-
one correspondence from {θt, τt} to {Kt, Lt}, the taxes {θt, τt} can be replaced
by employment {Lt} and capital {Kt} as the control variables of public policy.
The government therefore determines the sequences of employment {Lt} and
capital {Kt} to maximize social welfare (2) subject to (13). Noting (6), this
yields the first-order conditions
∂U
∂Ct
∂Ct
∂Lt
+
∂U
∂Lt
=
∂U
∂Ct
∂Ψ
∂Lt
(
Kt+1, Kt, Lt
)
+
∂U
∂Lt
= ρtC−σt
∂Ψ
∂Lt
(
Kt+1, Kt, Lt
)
− ρt = ρt
[
C−σt FL
(
Kt, Lt
)
− 1
]
= ρt
[
C−σt wt − 1
]
= 0 for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}, (18)
∂U
∂Ct
∂Ct
∂Kt
+
∂U
∂Ct−1
∂Ct−1
∂Kt
=
∂U
∂Ct
∂Ψ
∂Kt
(
Kt+1, Kt, Lt
)
+
∂U
∂Ct−1
∂Ψ
∂Kt
(
Kt, Kt−1, Lt−1
)
= ρtC−σt
∂Ψ
∂Kt
(
Kt+1, Kt, Lt
)
+ ρt−1C−σt−1
∂Ψ
∂Kt
(
Kt, Kt−1, Lt−1
)
= ρtC−σt
[
FK
(
Kt, Lt
)
+ 1− µ
]
− ρt−1C−σt−1
= ρtC−σt
[
FK
(
Kt, Lt
)
+ 1− µ−
(
Ct/Ct−1
)σ
/ρ
]
= 0 for t ∈ {2, ..., T}.
(19)
One observes first that the conditions (18) and (19) do not determine
the capital tax for the first period, θ1. This can be used to balance the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Solving for wt = C
σ
t from
(18) and inserting this into (14), one obtains:
Proposition 1 At times t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}, labor should be taxed at the rate
τt = 1/(1− ε), where ε is the wage elasticity of employment [Cf. (7)].
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The labor tax eliminates the eﬀect of union power by changing the slope of
the labor demand function so that in equilibrium the marginal product of
labor is equal to the opportunity cost of employment, FL = C
σ
t .
Inserting (17) into (19) and solving for θt, one obtains:
Proposition 2 At times t ∈ {2, ..., T}, capital should be taxed at the rate
θt = 1−
(
1−
wtLt
FKKt
β
)
−1
,
where wtLt/(FKKt) is the ratio of wages to the total return paid to capital
and β is the elasticity of the wage with respect to capital [Cf. (15)].
When capital accumulation increases (decreases) the wage wt – i.e., when
∂wt/∂Kt > 0 and β > 0 (∂wt/∂Kt < 0 and β < 0) – capital is below (above)
its socially optimal level. To eliminate this departure, capital accumulation
must be encouraged by a subsidy −θt > 0 (discouraged by a tax θt > 0).
Finally, from equations (6), (17), (18) and (19) it follows that FK
(
Kt, Lt
)
= rt+ µ and FK
(
Kt, Lt
)
= wt = C
σ. This proves that aggregate production
eﬃciency holds true at the optimum: the marginal product of labor, FL, is
equal to the opportunity cost of employment, Cσ, and the marginal product
of capital, FK , is equal to the marginal cost of maintaining capital, rt + µ.
4 Binding contracts
With binding wage contracts, the firm takes the sequences of wages {wt},
aggregate consumption {Ct}, the interest rate {rt} and the tax {θt} as given
and maximizes the present value (9) of its dividents by its sequence of capital
{Kt}. Noting (3), this leads to the equilibrium conditions
(
Ct/Ct−1
)σ
/ρ+ µ− 1 = µ+ rt = (1− θt)ΠK
(
Kt, wt
)
for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}.
(20)
This defines capital Kt as a function of the wage wt, the capital tax θt and
the change in consumption, Ct/Ct−1:
Kt = K
(
wt, θt, Ct/Ct−1
)
for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}. (21)
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The union takes the firm’s optimal investment policy (21) into account and
maximizes the present value of its members’ eﬀective income (11). Given
(10) and (21), this target can be written as:
T∑
t=1
Wt
1 + rt
=
T∑
t=1
1
1 + rt
[(
1− τt
)
wt − C
σ
t
]
Lt
(
K
(
wt, θt,
Ct
Ct−1
)
, wt
)
. (22)
The union sets the sequence of its wage {wt} to maximize (22), given the se-
quences of the interest rate {rt}, the taxes {τt, θt} and aggregate consumption
{Ct}. The first-order conditions of the maximization are given by
(
1− τt
)
Lt +
[(
1− τt
)
wt − C
σ
t
][ ∂Lt
∂Kt
∂Kt
∂wt
+
∂Lt
∂wt
]
= 0 for t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
(23)
Because the equations (21) and Lt = L(Kt, wt) [Cf. (6)] define a one-to-
one correspondence from {θt, τt} to {Kt, Lt}, the taxes {θt, τt} can be replaced
by employment {Lt} and capital {Kt} as the control variables of public policy.
The government therefore determines the sequences of employment {Lt} and
capital {Kt} to maximize social welfare (2) subject to (13). This leads to
the same first-order conditions (18) and (19) as in the case of non-binding
contracts. Accordingly, the capital taxes for the first period, θ1, are used
to balance the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Solving for
wt = C
σ
t from (18) and inserting into (14), one obtains that proposition 1
holds also in this case. Equations (6), (19) and (20) yield
(1− θt)FK = (1− θt)ΠK =
(
Ct/Ct−1
)σ
/ρ+ µ− 1 = FK
and θt = 0 for t ≥ 2. This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 3 In the presence of binding wage contracts, the capital tax θt
should be zero at times t ∈ {2, ..., T}.
Because the labor tax is suﬃcient to achieve the optimal production eﬃ-
ciency, the tax rate on capital income, θt, should be zero for t ≥ 2. Any
deviation from this zero tax rate distorts aggregate production eﬃciency.
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5 Conclusions
This paper examines optimal taxation in an economy with collective wage
bargaining. In each industry workers form a union, which raises their wage
above the opportunity cost of employment. The government taxes labor and
capital income and finances its deficit by issuing bonds. Two institutional
specifications of collective bargaining are compared: (i) there is some institu-
tion or technology through which a labor union can commit itself to binding
wage contracts, so that investors are protected against immediate expropri-
ation by unions after new machines are installed; and (ii) there is no such
commitment technology, so that investors must be prepared for immediate
expropriation. The main findings of this paper are the following.
In the steady state, employment should be determined so that the marginal
product of labor is equal to the opportunity cost of employment, and capital
so that its marginal product is equal to the marginal cost of maintaining
capital. Wages must be subsidized at the rate that compels the marginal
product of labor equal to the opportunity cost of employment. Zero taxation
of capital does not apply in the absence [i.e. in case (ii)], but applies in the
presence of binding wage contracts [i.e. in case (i)]. In the absence of binding
contracts, investors observe the wage as a function of their investment. Capi-
tal stock then converges to the level that is below (above) the social optimum
when capital accumulation increases (decreases) the wage. To eliminate this
departure, capital accumulation must be encouraged by a subsidy (discour-
aged by a tax). In the presence of binding contracts, investors take the wage
as given. Aggregate production eﬃciency can then be maintained by a labor
tax only and any deviation from zero capital taxation distorts aggregate pro-
duction eﬃciency. In both cases, the government budget should be balanced
by the capital tax in the first period.
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